Category: meshforum

CAPT (Ret.) Linda M. Lewandowski, United States Navy

Logistics in the 21st century security environment – really about building large scale organizational change.

Recognition of the complexity and the multi-dimensional global environment.

Distributed Adaptive Operations  – Security – diplomatic – economic – social – and ability to sense across mutiple dimensions and respond.

I’m paying more attention than typing – lots of new ideas for me….

DOD case study – sense and respond logistics – > 1/4 of DOD budget is logistics based. Catalyze transformation to a joint, adaptive logistics capability throughout DOD. Incorporate S&R logistics to allow DOD to gather operational data and evalute the sense and respond concept.

Imbed into DOD corporate DNA.

Ability to change the process was dependent on increasing the speed of command.

John Garstka – Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of DefenseNetwork centric operations and warfare.  Book – Network Centric Warfare.

Transformation  – co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and technology, new sources of power,  – broad and sustained competitive advantage.

Shift from industrial to information age: cold war containment strategies are not as relevant. Globalization and connectedness . Security = defense + all else. DOD spends more on IT than any organization in the world – but there are also social network and incentive issues which keep orgs stuck in industrial age behavior. What do they have to change to get people unstuck and into the information age response set.

Thomas Barnett– The Pentagon’s New Map (article) The “Mostly Disconnected Gap” – Life in the gap is poor, nasty, short, brutal, solitary.

There is an emergening security environment – catastrophic, disruptive, 2 others…

Transformational goals for Transformed Joint Forces –

There has been an order of magnitude change in key dimensions of warfare. – Domains – shared situational, – social domain  

 situational – cognitive domain

infomation created and shared – information domain  – it is key, but you need to go through the cognitive and social domains  to get the change out.

 strike maneuver protect – physical doman

Part of the difficult in transforming to network centric ops – is a social network problem. People in IT orgs might not understand how to put out the information in way users can understand it. There are key stakeholders that don’t talk with each other. Implementers don’t necessarily understand the creators.

Video– new situational awareness. Networked forces can outfight non-network forces. Slide still looks like major conventional engagements – NCO case studies are on their website. Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCP JRTC) report -from Iraq. A robust networked force improves information sharing. Info sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of info and shared situational awareness. Sahred situational awareness enables collaboration and self synchronization and enhances speed and sustainability of command – dramatic increase in mission effectiveness.

Stryker Brigade – Change process and structure  – improve effectiveness. DIfference between a light infantry brigade  vs. a Stryker brigade – organic – new capabilities. Differences –

Lt. Inf – Limited interaction by radio –  Stryker – widespread horizontal interaction, collaborate from anywhere.

There is limited bandwidth at the pointy edge of the spear (forward units may have about 14.4kbps capabilities). However, with new tech, commanders get 2x-10 magnitude change in scale of information – much better picture, shared situational awareness, better operational decisions. Win battle for info advantage, improve positions, win battles.

Technology, process, people and organizations.

Analogy – knowing where your company resources are, where your packages, data etc are – better decision making – increase agility – decrease risk.

Conceptual frame work for network centric operations.

Metrics for the quality of this organic information. Case studies help sell the changes. Leaders need to be able to understand benefit and support your case.

Really a fantastic presentation.

Question – terorrists are networked forces – there is a degree of asymetry – small groups can affect large casuaties with non conventional weapons such as cars and improvised mines – how can we out network them?

Ans: You can have 100% info on your own forces, but may have 0% information on enemy. You have to penetrate their networks or capture their info. engage and draw them out, then respond to what they do. Separating the counter insurgents from their social network – benefits of terrorists going away outweighs the status quo.